A Constitutional Oddity of Almost Byzantine Complexity: Analyzing the Efficiency of the Political Function Doctrine by Scopino, Gregory A.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 90
Issue 5 July 2005 Article 4
A Constitutional Oddity of Almost Byzantine
Complexity: Analyzing the Efficiency of the
Political Function Doctrine
Gregory A. Scopino
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Gregory A. Scopino, A Constitutional Oddity of Almost Byzantine Complexity: Analyzing the Efficiency of the Political Function Doctrine,
90 Cornell L. Rev. 1377 (2005)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol90/iss5/4
NOTE
A CONSTITUTIONAL ODDITY OF ALMOST BYZANTINE
COMPLEXITY: ANALYZING THE EFFICIENCY OF THE
POLITICAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE
Gregory A. Scopinot
INTRODUCTION ................................................. 1378
I. THE PomirfcAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE ..................... 1382
A. The Doctrinal Framework: Confusion and
C riticism ........................................... 1382
B. A Comparison to Race and National Origin
Classifications ....................................... 1386
C. Citizenship, Membership, and the Political
Com m unity ......................................... 1387
II. THE HISTORY OF STATE ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS ....... 1389
A. Early Supreme Court Interpretations ............... 1389
B. Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Special Public Interests ...... 1390
C. Strict Scrutiny for State Alienage Classifications ..... 1393
D. The Political Function Doctrine and the Rational
Relationship Test ................................... 1394
III. THE POLITICAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE ........ 1398
A. Traditional Legal Analysis .......................... 1398
B. The Political Function Doctrine and the
Employment Market ................................ 1400
IV. SUGGESTED REFINEMENTS TO THE CURRENT DOCTRINE .... 1405
A. Recognize Racial Animus and Covert
Classifications ....................................... 1406
B. Construe "Political Function" Narrowly ............. 1407
C. Subject Political Functions to Intermediate
Scrutiny ............................................ 1408
CONCLUSION ................................................... 1409
t B.A., Pennsylvania State University, 1993; J.D., Cornell Law School, 2005. The au-
thor was a Note Editor on Volume 90 of the Cornell Law Review. The author would like to
thank Professor Stephen Yale-Loehr, whose feedback was invaluable, and Professor Sheri
Lynn Johnson, whose Constitutional Law class provided the germ of the topic idea. The
author would also like to thank his wife, Augra Gudaityte-Scopino, for, among many other
things, encouragement to submit this Note for publication.
1377
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Many view the United States as a country that welcomes immi-
grants to its shores.' The country does not, however, always greet im-
migrants warmly. Throughout history, the United States has viewed
new waves of immigrants as "racially different outsiders" and "[a] t dif-
ferent historical moments, German, Irish, Jewish, and Italian immi-
grants all were deemed to be of different and inferior racial stock."2
Federal, state, and local governments have enacted laws that discrimi-
nated against foreign nationals,3 many of which were motivated by
xenophobia and racism.4 Some of these discriminatory laws imposed
substantial limitations on immigrants,5 such as prohibiting foreign na-
See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 294 (1978) (stating that the United States is
known as a "nation of immigrants" and that "[a]s a nation we exhibit extraordinary hospi-
tality to those who come to our country"); Kiyoko Kamio Knapp, The Rhetoric of Exclusion:
The Art of Drawing a Line Between Aliens and Citizens, 10 GEo. IMMIGR. L.J. 401, 407 (1996)
(describing America as an "immigration-driven society"); see also Excerpts From Bush's Address
on Allowing Immigrants to Fill Some Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at A28 (quoting President
Bush as saying "[a]s a nation that values immigration and depends on immigration, we
should have immigration laws that work and make us proud" and "America's a welcoming
country"). Furthermore, in July 2003, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security
launched a weeklong commemoration of "the importance of legal immigration" entitled,
"Celebrating a Nation of Immigrants." Press Release, Dep't of Homeland Security, Depart-
ment Marks July 4 by 'Celebrating A Nation of Immigrants': 9,500 New Americans to be
Welcomed at 50 Ceremonies Nationwide (June 30, 2003), at http://www.dhs.gov/dhspub-
lic/display?content=1052 (last visited Mar. 3, 2005). The activities primarily involved high-
level officials attending naturalization ceremonies at different historic locations through-
out the country. Id. Secretary of Homeland Security Tom Ridge commented that
"[w]elcoming new citizens to the United States is one of the most important things we do
as a nation." Id.
2 Kevin R. Johnson, The End of "Civil Rights" as We Know It?: Immigration and Civil
Rights in the New Millennium, 49 UCLA L. REv. 1481, 1486 (2002). For example, the adverse
treatment that immigrants currently face in areas like employment has prompted propos-
als to broaden the legal protection available to immigrants in the workplace. See Ruben J.
Garcia, Across the Borders: Immigrant Status and Identity in Law and LatCfit Theory, 55 FLA. L.
REv. 511, 519 (2003) (arguing that Congress should amend civil rights laws to "include
immigration status as a protected category in addition to race, color, ancestry, and national
origin").
- For a case in which a federal statute placed onerous requirements on immigrants,
see Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67 (1976), which concerned requirements to qualify for Medi-
care supplemental medical insurance. For cases related to state-level statutes burdening
immigrants, see Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195 (1915), which involved a state law prohibit-
ing employment of foreign nationals on projects that received public funding, and New
York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102 (1837), which upheld a New York City ordinance that
required ship masters to provide a list naming foreign nationals seeking entry to the city.
4 See Tamra M. Boyd, Note, Keeping the Constitution's Promise: An Argument for Greater
Judicial Scrutiny of Federal Alienage Classifications, 54 STAr. L. REv. 319, 322-23 (2001).
5 See Luis F.B. Plascencia et al., The Decline of Barriers to Immigrant Economic and Political
Rights in the American States, 1977-2001, 37 INT'L MIRATIoN REV., Spring 2003, at 5, 7. In
this article the authors studied state employment restrictions based on citizenship in the six
states with the highest immigrant populations and created an extensive list of occupations
reserved, at one time or another, for citizens. See id. at 9. The authors conclude that state
citizenship requirements have plummeted compared to prior decades, but that states re-
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tionals from owning property,6 running certain types of businesses, 7
and pursuing certain professions. 8 For example, state laws have re-
stricted noncitizens from selling liquor, operating pool halls, and
working as landscape architects, embalmers, pharmacists, dentists,
and surveyors.9
Discrimination against immigrants continues today,10 although
the explicit, state-mandated discrimination prevalent in prior decades
has decreased.1 Despite this trend, citizenship requirements remain
for a variety of occupations. For example, some states currently re-
quire teachers, peace officers, boiler engineers, tax collectors, private
detectives, labor dispute mediators, and firefighters to be citizens.1 2
Likewise, in some states, only citizens may establish churches, incorpo-
rate limited-profit housing companies, form fraternal benefit socie-
ties, and work for sanitary districts and public safety departments.
13
These discriminatory statutes suggest that many U.S. citizens per-
ceive immigrants as a threat. 14 National security concerns, specifically
fear of Muslim terrorists after the attacks on September 11, 2001, in-
creased prejudice against people of Muslim faith and Arab ancestry. 15
tain broad latitude in defining the boundaries of their political communities, including the
constitutional authority to impose citizenship requirements for employment. Id. at 20.
6 See Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197 (1923) (upholding a Washington state law
prohibiting land ownership by foreign nationals who did not declare their intention to
naturalize); see also Keith Aoli, No Right to Own?: The Early Twentieth-Century "Alien Land
Laws" as a Prelude to Internment, 40 B.C. L. REV. 37 (1998) (discussing the citizenship re-
quirements many states place on land ownership).
7 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 393 (1927) (upholding a
Cincinnati city ordinance that prohibited foreign nationals from running pool halls).
8 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 69 (1979) (upholding a New York law that
prohibited foreign nationals who refused to naturalize from serving as public school
teachers).
9 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 9.
10 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 320-21.
11 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 9.
12 See id. at 18.
13 See id. at 18-19. Several commentators have concluded that "the states have an
uninterrupted legacy of excluding noncitizen residents from important economic rights by
enacting laws that restrict employment, public benefits, operation of private businesses,
ownership of land, and other resources to U.S. citizens." Id. at 6.
14 See DAVID WEISSBRODT, IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE 45 (3d ed. 1992); see also
Patrick Healy, LI. Clash on Immigrants is Gaining Political Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at
Al (describing the hostile reaction of Long Island residents to the presence of Hispanic
immigrants, a reaction that prompted a proposal to give local law enforcement officers the
authority to detain illegal immigrants).
15 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1488-89; see also William Kates, Poll: Many Would Limit
Some Rights of Muslims, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Dec. 19, 2004, at A32. The article described
a Cornell University study regarding public fear of terrorism that found that nearly half of
the respondents to a national survey supported restrictions on the civil liberties of Muslim
Americans. Id. If poll respondents were willing to restrict the rights of citizens in the
interest of protection from terrorism, one could surmise that respondents might have sup-
ported equal or greater restrictions on noncitizens. See ERiK C. NIsBET &JAMES SHANAHAN,
MSRG SPECIAL REPORT: RESTRICTIONS ON CML LIBERTIES, VIEWS OF ISLAM, & MUSLIM AMERI-
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Similarly, when the U.S. economy is weak, foreign nationals frequently
become scapegoats for the difficult job market.16
To improve the position of foreign nationals in U.S. society, Presi-
dent Bush has recently announced a new federal policy that would
allow illegal immigrants to apply for temporary worker status. 17 Some
politicians criticized President Bush's plan, and it is not yet certain
whether Congress will pass his proposals."' Enactment of the Presi-
dent's immigration proposals would not guarantee better treatment of
noncitizens in all regards. The only certainty is that the nation's treat-
ment of noncitizens-an issue which the President's announcement
pushed to center stage-will remain a prominent topic in the nation's
capital.
CANS (Dec. 2004), at http://www.comm.cornell.edu/msrg/reportla.pdf (last visited Mar.
6, 2005); see also Kevin R. Johnson, September 11 and Mexican Immigrants: Collateral Damage
Comes Home, 52 DEPAUL L. REv. 849, 850 (2003) (arguing that "immigrants in general will
suffer the long-term consequences of the many measures taken by the federal government
in the name of fighting terrorism").
16 See William R. Tamayo, When the "Coloreds"Are Neither Black Nor Citizens: The United
States Civil Rights Movement and Global Migration, 2 ASLAN L.J. 1, 15 (1995). Tamayo contends
that "the recent economic downturn has heightened animosity toward the new
'coloreds'-immigrants from Asian, Latin America, the Middle East, and the Caribbean."
Id. Linda Bosniak describes numerous state-sponsored discriminatory measures that target
noncitizens and suggests a framework for analyzing alienage classifications. See Linda S.
Bosniak, Membership, Equality, and the Difference that Alienage Makes, 69 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1047
(1994). Bosniak believes that, because of a "perceived immigration crisis," the country has
difficulty with "alienage as a legal status category." Id.
17 See Steve Holland, Bush, Fox Discuss Immigration Reform, REUTERS, Nov. 21, 2004
(describing discussions between U.S. President George Bush and Mexican President Vi-
cente Fox about proposals to create a guest-worker program in the United States); see also
Elisabeth Bumiller, Bush Would Give Illegal Woiks Broad New Rights, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
2004, at Al (describing Bush's proposal for a "sweeping overhaul of the nation's immigra-
tion laws" that would allow undocumented noncitizens in the country illegally to register
for temporary worker status);Jeff Madrick, Economic Scene, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2004, at C2
(arguing that "limited migration" of workers "can be a vital source of economic growth in
developed and developing nations"); Dean E. Murphy, Imagining Life Without Illegal Immi-
grants, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, § 4, at I (discussing the reaction to President Bush's pro-
posals that "reopened the national debate about immigration"); President's State of the Union
Message to Congress and the Nation, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2004, at A18.
18 See David Abraham, Amencan Jobs but Not the American Dream, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 9,
2004, at A19 (comparing Bush's proposal to guest worker programs in Europe and con-
tending that those programs have failed); Elisabeth Bumiller, Politics at the Border; N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 8, 2004, at Al (quoting Cecilia Munoz, Vice President of the National Council
of the Hispanic advocacy group La Raza, as saying "when people learn the details of [Presi-
dent Bush's] proposal and what it does and doesn't do, it's likely to seem less appealing");
Arshad Mohammed, Powell Sees Better Chance for U.S. Immigration Reform, REUTERS, Nov. 9,
2004 (summarizing Powell's statements that the atmosphere in the U.S. Congress "may be
more favorable to allowing millions of illegal aliens in the United States to obtain legal
status"); Murphy, supra note 17 (quoting one Harvard economist as stating that "it is hard
to imagine a worse immigration reform proposal" than the one proposed by President
Bush).
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Because foreign nationals 19 cannot vote, 20 they are politically
powerless to prevent citizens from expressing their xenophobia in the
form of discriminatory laws. Muslim and Arab foreign nationals are
the victims of hate crimes, including murder, and the U.S. govern-
ment profiles them as security risks.2 1 State governments also discrim-
inate against other foreign nationals, particularly Latino and Mexican
immigrants. 22  Historically, federal and state governments23 used
alienage classifications to express "racial animus" and "to subordinate
certain racial groups. ' 24 State-sponsored discrimination promotes
negative stereotypes of foreign nationals as being disloyal and untrust-
worthy.25 Despite the negative effects of state alienage classifications,
courts uphold laws designed to define the state's political community
and reserve the powers of self-governance to citizens. 26 Thus, the
power of states to use alienage classifications is arguably "exceedingly
broad" and leads "to questionable exclusions of noncitizens from im-
portant activities."
27
Congress, state legislatures, and courts should consider whether
or not the laws and legal doctrines relating to noncitizens promote
efficiencies in the market that are beneficial to society. This Note ad-
dresses the rights of one class of immigrant noncitizens, frequently
called legal permanent residents (LPRs). This Note evaluates alien-
age classifications that limit the right of LPRs to pursue careers in the
19 For purposes of this Note, "foreign nationals" will refer to legal permanent re-
sidents (LPRs). "Foreign national" is preferable to "immigrant," which merely refers to
people who moved into a country, regardless of how long ago they moved. This Note does
not address the status of foreign nationals who are in the country illegally.
20 LPRs cannot vote in state or federal elections, even though the Constitution does
not explicitly require that result. See Knapp, supra note 1, at 405.
21 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1488-89.
22 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 340; Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in
Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH. U. L.Q. 675, 707 (2000) (noting that border patrol au-
thorities use race as one factor in deciding whether to conduct investigatory stops, even
though Hispanics constitute a majority of the population in many communities, like those
near the California-Mexico border).
23 Although this Note will specifically address alienage classifications the states cre-
ated, some discussion of the federal government's use of citizenship as a classifying tool is
necessary for comparative purposes and to provide a full history of the jurisprudence in
this area.
24 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 339.
25 See Victor C. Romero, Proxies for Loyalty in Constitutional Immigration Law: Citizenship
and Race after September 11, 52 DEPAUL L. RFv. 871, 878 (2003) (discussing the "psychologi-
cal costs" of race and citizenship-based suspicion on the targets of government profiling
and laws based on race and national origin). Romero also discusses the use of citizenship
requirements and racial profiling, primarily against Muslims and Arabs, since the terrorist
attacks of September 11, 2001. Id.
26 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 439 (1982) (holding that "some state
functions are so bound up with the operation of the State as a governmental entity" that
reserving those posts for citizens is justified).
27 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 5-7.
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United States, specifically focusing on the efficiency of citizenship re-
quirements for employment in various jobs and occupations that the
states designate as "political functions." The primary question this
Note seeks to answer is whether markets function efficiently when
states require some employers to deny individuals employment solely
based on citizenship. As a result of the overlap between citizenship
status and race,28 and the influence of race on immigration laws and
citizenship requirements in the United States, 29 an economic analysis
of state citizenship requirements must also consider the effects of ra-
cism on markets.
Part I of this Note outlines the political function doctrine, which
frames the limits on state and local use of alienage classifications, and
then explains the Supreme Court's modern doctrinal framework.
Part II summarizes the history of alienage jurisprudence in connec-
tion with state and local laws. Part III then analyzes the efficiency of
the political function doctrine. Part III finds that citizenship require-
ments force employers to select employees based on a factor unre-
lated to job performance and that these requirements ultimately
perpetuate racism in the labor market. Part III also contends that the
political function doctrine itself is inefficient because it enables citi-
zenship requirements to survive court scrutiny, while also making it
easier for states to compel discrimination against foreigners and eth-
nic groups. Finally, Part IV argues that courts should eliminate the
political function doctrine because it insulates state-created market in-
efficiencies from heightened judicial review. Because courts are un-
likely to reject the political function doctrine altogether, Part IV also
suggests ways to refine the doctrine to limit the harmful effects citizen-
ship requirements have on the market.
I
THE PoLITiCAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE
A. The Doctrinal Framework: Confusion and Criticism
The Supreme Court's alienage classification jurisprudence is
widely criticized. Some commentators say that the Court is not at its
analytical best in this area.50 Others contend that the Court's deci-
28 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 414-16.
29 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323; Johnson, supra note 2, at 1485; Knapp, supra note 1,
at 418-19.
30 See David A. Martin, Due Process and Membership in the National Community: Political
Asylum and Beyond, 44 U. Pir. L. REv. 165, 196 (1983), cited in Note, The Functionality of
Citizenship, 110 HARv. L. REv. 1814, 1822 n.52 (1997); 3 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &JOHN E.
NowAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: SUBSTANCE & PROCEDURE § 18.2 (3d ed. 1999);
Knapp, supra note 1, at 417.
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sions have relied on "legal fictions"3' and flawed, if not incoherent,
reasoning.3 2 The main criticism of the Court's alienage jurisprudence
is that it applies a myriad of standards in judging alienage classifica-
tions-and it strikes down and upholds remarkably similar laws.3 3 Un-
fortunately, although the "almost byzantine complexity"34 of the
Court's alienage jurisprudence has led commentators to call it a "con-
stitutional oddity, '3s 5 the current doctrinal framework seems likely to
remain, absent a drastic reshaping of the Court's composition.
The Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amend-
ments36 and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protect foreign nationals. 37 The Equal Protection Clause
applies to all people in the United States and requires that the govern-
ment treat similarly situated people similarly.38 The Fourteenth
Amendment applies to state actions, including actions by local govern-
ments. 39 Although the original purpose of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was to prohibit discrimination against African Americans, 40 the
Court favors an expansive reading of the Equal Protection Clause to
cover other forms of racial and ethnic discrimination. 41 The Court
31 See Ibrahim J. Wani, Truth, Strangers, and Fiction: The Illegitimate Uses of Legal Fiction in
Immigration Law, 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 51, 61 (1989).
32 See Michael Scaperlanda, Partial Membership: Aliens and the Constitutional Community,
81 IOwA L. REv. 707, 711 (1996) (referring to the Court's "seemingly incoherent [alien-
age] jurisprudence" and lack of "doctrinal consistency").
33 See 3 RoTUNDA & NowAx, supra note 30, § 18.2 ("The Supreme Court has refused to
enunciate a single test to be used when determining the compatibility of alienage classifica-
tions with the equal protection guarantee .... "); see also Liliana M. Garcas, Evolving Notions
of Membership: The Significance of Communal Ties in AlienageJurisprudence, 71 S. CAL. L. REv.
1037, 1038 (1998) (examining the Court's alienage jurisprudence, noting the "disparate
approaches and outcomes in alienage cases," and attempting to provide a framework for
understanding the divergent results). For example, the Court struck down a state law that
required citizenship to practice law, see In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973), but upheld a law
requiring citizenship to teach in a public schools, see Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
It is difficult to understand why lawyers, who are officers of the court, do not need to be
citizens while first-grade teachers must be. See also Victor C. Romero, The Congruence Princi-
ple Applied: Rethinking Equal Protection Review of Federal Alienage Classfications After Adarand
Constructors, Inc. v. Pefia, 76 OR. L. REv. 425, 426-29 (1997) (describing the different
judicial standards of review for federal and state alienage classifications and arguing for
"congruence" of standards).
34 Earl M. Maltz, Citizenship and the Constitution: A History and Critique of the Supreme
Court's Alienage Jurisprudence, 28 Amiz. ST. LJ. 1135, 1181 (1996).
35 See Scaperlanda, supra note 32, at 741.
36 U.S. CONST. amends. V; XIV, § 1.
37 See id. amend. XIV, § 1.
38 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 407-08 (explaining that the Equal Protection Clause
governs people within the "territorial jurisdiction" of the country).
39 See 3 ROTUNDA & NOwAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.
40 See Gilbert Paul Carrasco, Congressional Arrogation of Power: Alien Constellation in the
Galaxy of Equal Protection, 74 B.U. L. REv. 591, 608 (1994).
41 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 408 ("However, as the nation's population diversified,
the reach of the Clause gradually expanded to all ethnic groups."); Thurgood Marshall,
Reflections on the Bicentennial of the United States Constitution, 101 HARV. L. Rev. 1, 5 (1987).
13832005]
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uses several different standards to determine whether alienage classifi-
cations are compatible with the Constitution's equal protection guar-
antee, 42 ranging from strict scrutiny43 to the near abandonment of
any scrutiny.4 4
Federalism concerns also play a role in many Court decisions re-
lating to state and local alienage classifications. 45 The Supremacy
Clause dictates that state actions conflicting with the Constitution are
invalid. 46 Therefore, if the Constitution specifically grants the federal
government authority over a particular area of the law, the states can-
not interfere. 47 The federal concern with state use of alienage classifi-
cations derives from the fact that the federal government (and not the
states) has the authority to control immigration and naturalization. 4
The Court defers to federal legislation and executive action that
relates to immigration and naturalization because of the foreign af-
fairs power those branches exercise. 49 Because state and local govern-
ments are not involved in foreign affairs, "their use of alienage
classifications would have to be reasonably justified by a significant
local interest."50 Therefore, state laws that classify based on alienage
are subject to strictjudicial scrutiny, 51 unless the classification involves
the state's powers of "self-governance" or other "political functions. '5 2
Laws that fall within the political function exception are subject to
less-searching scrutiny and must only rationally relate to a legitimate
government objective. 53 The Court generally upholds laws that fall
42 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 409-11.
43 See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (applying strict scrutiny to an
alienage classification).
44 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972) (treating the alienage classifica-
tion in a manner similar to a nonjusticiable political question and refusing to subject the
government action to any form of meaningful scrutiny).
45 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1154.
46 See U.S. CONsT. art. VI, cl. 2; Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (hold-
ing that a state law governing the admission of foreign nationals who arrived by ship was
invalid because it conflicted with the Commerce Clause power).
47 See Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 280-81.
48 See 3 ROTUNDA & Now~Ay, supra note 30, § 18.12.
49 See id. (explaining that "[slo long as a federal alienage classification was not a to-
tally arbitrary means of disfavoring lawfully resident aliens, the classification would be up-
held" because of the "federal interest in international affairs, as well as the federal power
over immigration and naturalization").
50 Id.
51 See id.
52 See id. (stating that a local "alienage classification .. .which relates to allocating
power or positions in the political process will be upheld under the traditional rational
basis test").
53 An example may help illustrate the impact of the political function doctrine. State
A passes a law making it illegal for noncitizens to fish in state rivers. State B passes a law
making it illegal for noncitizens to become police officers. A court would likely subject
State A's law to strict scrutiny. Fishing in rivers has nothing to do with the "political func-
tions" related to the process of state self-governance. A court would likely subject State B's
1384
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within the political function exception and receive this lower level of
scrutiny.5
4
Although the federal government can use classifications based on
alienage with near impunity from judicial review, 55 the states receive
less deference from the courts. Professor Gerald Neuman suggests
that the history of xenophobia in the United States illustrates why the
Court should view state alienage classifications with skepticism. 56
First, particular immigrant groups tend to settle in the United States
in clusters based on ethnicity,57 which results in tensions between
groups of foreign nationals and local citizens. 58 This tension often
takes the form of "localized anti-alien movements." 59 Unlike individ-
ual states, the federal government is less likely to fall prey to such
xenophobic fervor "in part because emotions are not running so high
in other states at the moment."60 Neuman also argues that aliens
"have some virtual representation in Washington by means of the for-
eign affairs establishment, which knows that the United States will
have to answer in the international community for actions taken at
home." 6' Because states cannot control the entry of foreign nationals,
states direct "their frustration and resentment about unwelcome fed-
eral policies into hostility toward" the foreign nationals who reside
within the state's borders.6 2 For this reason, courts view state alienage
classifications with more suspicion than federal classifications.
law, however, to rational relationship scrutiny because police officers represent the author-
ity of the state, and the role of a police officer is an important political function.
54 See Gerald Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1, 14-15
(1972). In comparison to rational basis review, Gunther described strict scrutiny as "'strict'
in theory and fatal in fact." See id. at 8; see also Williamson v. Lee Optical Inc., 348 U.S. 483,
487-88 (1955) (describing the rational basis review standard).
55 See Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 769-70 (1972).
56 See Gerald L. Neuman, Aliens as Outlaws: Government Services, Proposition 187, and the
Structure of Equal Protection Doctrine, 42 UCLA L. RE,. 1425, 1436-37 (1995).
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id. For example, California has enacted laws to prevent Asian immigrants from
engaging in activities such as fishing, see, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.,
410 (1948), and operating laundries, see, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
The most notable modern example of such behavior in California is Proposition 187,
which denies undocumented foreign nationals ("illegal immigrants") access to basic gov-
ernment services. See CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 10001.5 (West 2001); see also Patrick
Healy, L.L Clash on Immigrants is Gaining Political Force, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2004, at Al
(detailing attempts of Long Island politicians to prevent Hispanic immigrants from living
and working in their communities by strictly enforcing ordinances to prevent groups of day
laborers from waiting for potential employers on street corners).
60 See Neuman, supra note 56, at 1435-37 (stating that this is why "local anti-foreign
movements may have difficulty enlisting the national government in their crusades").
61 Id. at 1436-37.
62 See id. at 1436-39.
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Nonetheless, the political function doctrine enables states to clas-
sify people based on alienage in ways that federal courts would forbid
if it were done according to race or gender. 63 For example, the Su-
preme Court would not uphold a law that prohibited African Ameri-
cans from serving as peace officers, but the Supreme Court upheld a
California law that banned noncitizens from suchjobs. 64 Additionally,
although the Court struck down state laws prohibiting foreign nation-
als from obtaining fishing licenses, 65 working as professional engi-
neers,66 gaining admission to the state bar, 67 and becoming notaries
public, 68 the Court upheld state laws prohibiting foreign nationals
from becoming public school teachers, 69 state troopers, 70 and peace
officers. 7 1 Finally, although the Court has held that a blanket prohibi-
tion on foreign nationals from state civil service posts violates the Due
Process Clause, 72 the most recent Supreme Court decisions favor a
broad reading of the political function doctrine. 73
B. A Comparison to Race and National Origin Classifications
The Court's analysis of the Equal Protection Clause regarding
classifications based on race and national origin is relevant because
citizens often direct racial animosity towardnewcomers to the coun-
try.7 4 Race and national origin classifications are "suspect,"75 which
means that such classifications are unconstitutional "unless they are
necessary to promote a 'compelling' or 'overriding' interest of govern-
ment."76 Racial classifications "run[ ] counter to the most fundamen-
63 See Carrasco, supra note 40, at 614-17 (describing the jurisprudential framework
for analysis of state and federal alienage classifications).
64 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 433 (1982) (upholding a state alienage
classification that required citizenship of "peace officers"). On the other hand, a racial
classification, such as a state law that prohibited Asian Americans from getting jobs as
peace officers, would violate the Constitution. See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30,
§ 18.5 (stating that "[c]lassifications based on race or national origin have been held to be
'suspect'" and therefore courts will subject such classifications to strict scrutiny).
65 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 412-22 (1948).
66 See Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects and Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S.
572, 599-601 (1976).
67 See In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717, 718 (1973).
68 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 219-28 (1984).
69 See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
70 See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
71 See Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982).
72 See Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 638-43 (1973).
73 For a case involving school teachers as construed to be "policy makers," see Ambach,
441 U.S. at 72-81. For a case upholding a citizenship requirement for toll takers, see
Cabell 454 U.S. at 442.
74 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1485-86; Boyd, supra note 4, at 341. For the source of
the information provided in this brief summary of equal protection jurisprudence, see 3
ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.
75 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.5.
76 Id.
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tal concept of equal protection. ' 77 Discrimination based on national
origin and ancestry is likewise considered suspect.7 Thus, classifica-
tions based on national origin or ancestry are generally invalid.
79
A nexus of discriminatory intent often combines racism with xen-
ophobia.8 0 If a state described its classification using explicitly racist
terms, however, the Supreme Court would likely invalidate the classifi-
cation as unconstitutional.8 1 Courts are more tolerant and apply strict
scrutiny far less frequently when states distinguish based on citizen-
ship.8 2 Courts should be aware of the "overlap" between alienage and
race "[t]o ensure that the law does not invite invidious racial or na-
tional origin discrimination through reliance on citizenship status."83
Thus, a citizenship requirement for a job as a teacher or probation
officer might withstand legal scrutiny, even if a court would not up-
hold a racial requirement for such occupations.8 4 Consequently, the
overlap between alienage and race in the United States potentially en-
ables states to use citizenship requirements as a proxy for unlawful
racial discrimination.8 5
C. Citizenship, Membership, and the Political Community
The debate over whether federal courts should permit states and
local governments to use alienage classifications centers on the mean-
ing and value of citizenship. An analysis of the Court's alienage juris-
prudence involves a study of the extent to which states and local
governments may treat citizens differently from legal permanent re-
sidents (LPRs). About one million foreign nationals become LPRs
77 Id.
78 See id. The distinction between national origin and alienage is important. An alien-
age classification refers to citizenship, while national origin refers to ethnicity or ancestry.
79 See Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 514-17 (2000) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment prohibited Hawaii from allowing only "Native Hawaiians" to vote for members
of a board that administered programs to help Native Hawaiians because the law was an
improper ancestry classification).
80 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323.
81 See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948) (invalidating a law
that, as written in an earlier version, explicitly banned "alien Japanese" from acquiring
fishing licenses).
82 Compare 3 ROTUNDA & Now~A, supra note 30, § 18.12 (explaining that state-but
not federal-alienage classifications receive strict scrutiny unless the classification relates
to a political function), with id. § 18.5 (stating that racial classifications uniformly receive
strict scrutiny). Therefore, while a court would always subject racial classifications to strict
scrutiny, it might subject an alienage classification to rational relationship scrutiny.
83 SeeJohnson, supra note 2, at 1506-07 (arguing that neglecting to address the over-
lap between alienage and racial status "has significant practical consequences").
84 See id. at 1505-06 (stating that "[a]lthough the law tolerates discrimination based
on citizenship status within limits, it generally prohibits discrimination on the basis of
race").
85 See id. at 1506-07.
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each year8 6 and contribute to American economic and cultural life by,
among other things, paying taxes and serving in the U.S. armed
forces.8 7
The vast majority of LPRs cannot naturalize immediately and
must wait for a period of time, usually five years. 88 The law does not
require LPRs to naturalize; 89 the majority of foreign nationals who
become LPRs receive that opportunity because they are closely related
to U.S. citizens and therefore are "family sponsored." 90 This is not
surprising, as family unification is one of the primary goals of the na-
tion's immigration policy. 9' Some LPRs arrive in the United States as
children and therefore are "without much touch with their country of
citizenship" and have "no reason to feel or to establish firm ties with
any place besides the United States."92
Citizenship has been called "a universal and distinctive feature of
the modern political landscape" that is not "a mere reflex of resi-
dence."9 Indeed, the Supreme Court has stated that "it would be dif-
ficult to exaggerate [the] value and importance" of U.S. citizenship.9 4
But even if the Constitution permits some difference in treatment be-
86 The number of new LPRs varies from year to year. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2000
STATISTICA-L YEARBOOK OF THE IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE (2002). In 2000,
the United States granted about 850,000 foreign nationals permanent resident status. Id.
at 1. Sixty-nine percent of those LPRs were family sponsored. Id. at 2. In 2002, the United
States allowed slightly more than one million foreign nationals to become LPRs. U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS 6 (2003) [hereinafter 2002
YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRATION STATISTICS]. Sixty-three percent of these LPRs were family spon-
sored. Id. In 2001, the United States also allowed slightly more than one million foreign
nationals to become LPRs. U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 2001 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA-
TION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 3 (2003). Sixty-four percent of LPRs in 2001 were fam-
ily sponsored. Id. LPRs who arc not family sponsored typically are either admitted under
employment preferences or refugees seeking asylum. Id. at 11-13.
87 See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 544 (2003) (Souter, J., dissenting) (noting that
male LPRs between the ages of 18 and 26 must register with the Selective Service); Knapp,
supra note 1, at 402 (noting that LPRs serve in the military, pay taxes, and benefit the
community in many other ways).
88 See Demore, 538 U.S. at 544-47 (Souter, J., dissenting); 2002 YEARBOOK OF IMMIGRA-
TION STATISTICS, supra note 86, at 1; AUSTIN T. FRACOMEN,JR. RT AL., 2 IMMIGRATION LAw &
BUSINESS § 5:14 (2004). The Fragomen treatise explains that an LPR cannot apply for
naturalization until meeting the "continuous residence and physical presence require-
ments" of the immigration laws. Id. Generally, an LPR must "have resided continuously in
the United States for five years." Id.
89 See 1 FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 88, § 3:1 (stating that LPRs possess "the status
of having been lawfully accorded the privilege of residing permanently in the United States"
(emphasis added)) .
90 See 2002 YEAROOK OF IMMIGRATION STArIsIICS, supra note 86, at 4.
91 See id.; see also Demore, 538 U.S. at 544 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that "the
United States goes out of iLs way to encourage just such [familial] attachments by creating
immigration preferences for those with a citizen as a close relation").
92 Demore, 538 U.S. at 544-45 (Souter, J., dissenting).
93 THOMAS ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF ET AL., IMMIGRATION AND CITIZENSHIP: PROCESS AND
POLIcY 2 (5th ed. 2003).
94 Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 122 (1943).
[Vol. 90:13771388
A CONSTITUTIONAL ODDITY
tween citizens and foreign nationals, the range and extent of such
differences must be delineated. 95 The importance of citizenship
"does not answer the ... important question of how many rights and
which ones are reserved strictly for citizens."96
Specifying the scope of the political function doctrine is "the art
of drawing a line" between citizens and foreign nationals. 97 One
could view the political function doctrine as "reflect[ing] the Court's
desire to preserve the significance of citizenship as an expression of
community."9 8 Since the 1970s, a majority of the Justices seem to have
believed that subjecting all state alienage classifications to close judi-
cial scrutiny would remove the distinctions between citizens and aliens
and thus "depreciate the symbolic values of citizenship."99 Citizenship
is less valuable if the law does not distinguish between foreign nation-
als and citizens, especially in areas involving self-governance. 0° The
primary question concerns the scope of the political function excep-
tion-the broader the reach of the doctrine, the more likely it will
curtail the access of foreign nationals to specific occupations.
II
THE HISTORY OF STATE ALIENAGE CLASSIFICATIONS
Today, courts subject state alienage classifications to strict judicial
scrutiny unless those classifications concern state efforts to define its
political community.1 0 1 This approach, however, has not always been
dominant; the Court's alienage jurisprudence has evolved since the
founding of the nation as jurisprudential paradigms developed and
changed. 102
A. Early Supreme Court Interpretations
Early Supreme Court decisions hinged on federalism concerns
regarding the boundaries between state and federal authority over
borders and immigration, specifically whether states retained signifi-
95 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 328.
96 Id.
97 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 412.
98 See id.
99 See id.
100 See id.
101 See id. at 411.
102 For informative histories of the Court's alienage jurisprudence, see 3 ROTUNDA &
NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12, which provides an excellent overview of the Court's alien-
age jurisprudence throughout history, and Maltz, supra note 34, at 1148-62, which argues
in support of the ability of states to classify based on alienage. See also Gerald L. Neuman,
The Lost Century of American Immigration Law (1776-1885), 93 COLUM. L. REv. 1833, 1834
(1993) (countering the myth that "the borders of the United States were legally open until
the enactment of federal immigration legislation in the 1870s and 1880s").
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cant independent authority over their borders. 10 3 Initially, the Court
seemed untroubled by state initiatives to control immigration. For ex-
ample, in 1837 the Court upheld a New York City ordinance that or-
dered ship masters to submit a report under oath providing "the
name, place of birth, and last legal settlement, age and occupation, of
every person . . . brought as a passenger."104 Later, the Supreme
Court removed the ability of the states to regulate immigration be-
cause the states were visibly abusing immigration and border control
powers through overzealous attempts to curtail immigration. 10 5 In its
effort to rein in the wayward states, the Court invoked the Commerce
Clause power to regulate commerce with foreign nations. 10 6 The
Court reversed its earlier permissive attitude and held that the Com-
merce Clause functions to "exclude the States from regulating com-
merce in any way" v07 and that regulation of transportation in
interstate commerce practically operated as a regulation of commerce
itself.'0 8 The Court also emphasized the need for the federal govern-
ment to have singular authority over immigration and naturaliza-
tion.10 9 Thus, the general rule was that the federal government
controlled immigration and the treatment of aliens, and the states
could not meddle. The question remained to what extent states could
classify people based on alienage in areas outside of immigration and
border control.110
B. Yick Wo v. Hopkins and Special Public Interests
In Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 1' the Court explicitly ruled that foreign
nationals fell within the term "any person" in the Fourteenth Amend-
ment of the Constitution, meaning that the Constitution afforded for-
eign nationals equal protection of the law."12 In Yick Wo, a Chinese
103t See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1155.
104 City of New York v. Miln, 36 U.S. (11 Pet.) 102, 130 (1837).
105 See Morgan's S.S. Co. v. La. Bd. of Health, 118 U.S. 455, 465-66 (1886) (permitting
ships in foreign commerce to be subjected to state quarantine regulations); Chy Lung v.
Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 277 (1876) (invalidating a California law that required ship masters
to post a bond for foreign female passengers that state officials believed were prostitutes);
Neuman, supra note 56, at 1436.
106 See, e.g., Smith v. Turner, 48 U.S. 283, 419 (1849) (relying on the Commerce Clause
to strike down immigration control laws).
107 Id, at 417.
108 See id. at 419.
109 See id.
110 See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1890-91 (noting that, even after Smith v. Turner,
"[t]he lower courts understood the Supreme Court as approving state police power over
certain categories of migrants" and that "[i]n some instances these cases were invoked as
suggesting broad state power, while in others they were read as limiting state power to a
short list of traditional categories").
111 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
112 See id. at 368-69; see also Maltz, supra note 34, at 1156-57 (providing an informative
discussion of Yick Wo and its significance).
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foreign national challenged an ordinance that required city approval
to operate a laundry in a wooden building.113 The Court unani-
mously held that the public supervisors violated the Equal Protection
Clause by denying two hundred Chinese individuals approval while
permitting eighty non-Chinese individuals to operate "the same busi-
ness under similar conditions."1 14
Although Yick Wo seemed to place foreign nationals on an equal
footing with U.S. citizens with respect to Equal Protection Clause
rights, other cases decided around the same time did not turn out so
favorably. 1 5 In fact, the Court endorsed state use of alienage classifi-
cations as legitimate and proper by upholding several laws that openly
discriminated against foreign nationa-s. 116 The Court permitted states
to treat foreign nationals differently than citizens "whenever the alien-
age classification related to a 'special public interest,"' provided that
the states proferred a justification other than "mere hostility toward
aliens." 117 For example, in 1914 the Court upheld a Pennsylvania stat-
ute that prohibited foreign nationals from hunting game. 118 In 1915,
the Court allowed states to prohibit foreign nationals from working on
government-funded public works projects.1 19
At the same time, the Court affirmed its protection of foreign
nationals against classifications that did not support a special public
interest. In Truax v. Raich,120 the Court struck down a provision of the
Arizona Constitution that required eighty percent of every employer's
workforce to be citizens. 121 The Court held that the right to work was
"the very essence of the personal freedom and opportunity" the Equal
Protection Clause guarantees.122
The Court's decision in Truax did not, however, hold that states
had to treat foreign nationals and citizens equally. 123 States simply
could not use alienage classifications to deprive foreign nationals of
113 See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 365-66.
114 See id. at 374.
115 See, e.g., Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392, 396-97 (1927) (upholding
a state statute that prohibited noncitizens from receiving licenses to operate poolrooms);
Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 218 (1923) (upholding a state law that prohibited
noncitizens from owning land); Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 145-46 (1914) (up-
holding a state law that prohibited noncitizens from hunting game).
116 See 3 ROTUNDA & NowaK, supra note 30, § 18.12.
117 See id. ("The restriction on aliens fell into three main categories: use of natural
resources, ownership of land, and employment.").
18 Patsone, 232 U.S. at 143-46.
119 SeeCrane v. NewYork, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 194
(1915).
120 239 U.S. 33 (1915).
121 See id. at 43.
122 Id. at 41.
123 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1158 (contending that Yick Wo and Truax "are about
'equality' only in a very limited sense").
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the right to make a living. 12 4 After Truax, states made sure to justify
alienage classifications as legitimately needed to serve a special public
interest, such as the preservation of valuable state resources.1 5 The
difference between "an ordinary means of livelihood" and a resource
worthy of "special public interest" was a "value-laden judgment," and
the Court usually sided with the state over the foreign national. 126
In 1948, the Court approached state alienage classifications dif-
ferently. In Takahashi v. Fish & Game Commission, the Court struck
down a California statute that prohibited issuance of a fishing license
to any "person ineligible to [sic] citizenship."'1 7 The California legis-
lature first passed a law that prohibited Japanese nationals from re-
ceiving fishing licenses while the United States was at war with Japan,
but the state changed the law (to exclude those "ineligible to citizen-
ship") because state officials believed a law explicitly referencing one
racial classification would be unconstitutional. 12 8  California argued
that its law fit under the protection of the special public interest doc-
trine and that the state's interest in the fish allowed a restriction on
the ability of foreign nationals to use valuable natural resources. 129
The argument fit well with prior case law involving the special public
interest doctrine,1 30 but in Takahashi the Court reached a different
result. Takahashi represented an important shift in the Court's alien-
age jurisprudence because it viewed the state law as a racial classifica-
tion motivated by California's desire to discriminate against Japanese
nationals. 3 1
124 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 410.
125 See, e.g., Cockrill v. California, 268 U.S. 258, 261 (1925) (upholding a state statute
under which land would escheat to the state if the owner attempted to convey it to a nonci-
tizen); Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 334 (1923) (supporting a state law that prohibited
transfer to noncitizens of shares of a corporation that owned land); Webb v. O'Brien, 263
U.S. 313, 322-23 (1923) (upholding a law that prohibited food crop contracts with nonci-
tizens); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 217 (1923) (upholding a state statute prohibit-
ing land ownership by noncitizens because the state had a "special public interest" in the
use of its land); Crane v. New York, 239 U.S. 195, 198 (1915) (upholding a state law that
required the hiring of citizens for public works projects because of the "public character"
of such work); Helm v. McCall, 239 U.S. 175, 192-93 (1915) (same).
126 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 410.
127 334 U.S. 410, 413 (1948).
128 See id.
129 See id. at 419.
130 See, e.g., Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138, 143-46 (1914).
131 See Takahashi, 334 U.S. at 420; id. at 422 (Murphy, J., concurring) ("Even the most
cursory examination of the background of the statute demonstrates that it was designed
solely to discriminate against such persons in a manner inconsistent with the concept of
equal protection of the laws. Legislation of that type is not entitled to wear the cloak of
constitutionality.").
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C. Strict Scrutiny for State Alienage Classifications
In 1971, the Court extended its holding in Takahashi and sub-
jected an alienage classification to strict judicial scrutiny, thereby
throwing the special public interest line of cases into question. 132 In
Graham v. Richardson, the Court held that a state violated the Equal
Protection Clause if it limited welfare benefits to citizens or individu-
als who had lived in the country for a period of time.1 33" Relying on
Takahashi, the Court stated that its case law generally considered state
alienage classifications to be similar to racial and national origin classi-
fications.13 4 The Court bolstered its argument by citing the famous
footnote four from United States v. Carolene Products Co. 1 35 in which the
Court expressed a willingness to use higher scrutiny on laws that nega-
tively impact "discrete and insular minorities" that have historically
been subjected to discrimination and are unable to protect themselves
in the political process.13 6
In Graham, the Court promised to protect foreign nationals from
discriminatory state alienage classifications. 13 7 In In re Griffiths in
1973, the Court struck down a Connecticut statute that allowed only
citizens to practice law.' -3 8 The Court rejected Connecticut's argu-
ment that citizenship was relevant to a person's suitability to be an
attorney and held that the justification was not compelling enough to
survive strict scrutiny. 139 The Court reasoned that categorically
prohibiting foreign nationals from practicing law merely because
some were unsuited to become attorneys was overinclusive and not
narrowly tailored.1 40
132 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1164 (arguing that the Court's holding in Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971), went further than the Takahashi decision in requiring
"affirmative support for certain classes of aliens").
133 See Graham, 403 U.S. at 372. The Graham decision scrutinized Arizona and Penn-
sylvania laws that limited the extent to which LPRs could take advantage of state welfare
programs.
134 See id. at 371.
135 See id. at 372.
136 304 U.S. 144, 152-53 n.4 (1938).
137 Not everyone has such a positive reading of Graham. Professor Maltz believes that
Graham "threatened to reduce the incidents of citizenship to their barest essentials-the
right to remain in the country indefinitely, the right to return after traveling abroad, and
the right to claim the protection of the government of the United States while traveling
abroad." Maltz, supra note 34, at 1166.
138 In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973).
139 See id. at 729. The Court stated that duties of lawyers did not involve matters of
state policy or unique responsibility such that the state could justify entrusting those duties
only to citizens. Id.
140 See id. at 725. Professor Maltz believes that, based on the reasoning of the Griffiths
decision, states would almost never be able to use alienage classifications because
"[h]istorically, few occupations have been as extensively regulated as the practice of law;
thus if states are forbidden to reserve this profession to citizens, it is difficult to see how
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The Court never issued another opinion as far-reaching in its pro-
tection of foreign nationals from state alienage classifications as Gra-
ham. In a series of opinions beginning in the 1970s, the Court
narrowed the protection against discrimination afforded foreign na-
tionals. 14 1 In Sugarman v. Dougall, the Court struck down a New York
Civil Service Law that mandated that state civil service employees be
U.S. citizens. 142 The law's objective was to ensure that the state hired
"loyal" workers. 14s The Court reasoned that the classification was
both overinclusive, because it applied to posts that did not make gov-
ernment policy, and underinclusive, because it did not apply to some
jobs that did.144
Although Sugarman was positive for foreign nationals, the Court
indicated that its holding was narrow. 14 5 The decision laid the foun-
dation for what would become the political function exception. Spe-
cifically, the Court held that states could constitutionally require
citizenship for "persons holding state elective or important nonelec-
tive executive, leg;slative, and judicial positions, for officers who par-
ticipate directly in the formulation, execution, or review of broad
public policy functions that go to the heart of representative govern-
ment."146 In dicta, the Court. clearly recognized that a state retains
the "power to exclude aliens from participation in its democratic po-
litical institutions."1 4 7 The seeds sown in the Sugarman dicta did not
bear fruit until a few years later. In the meantime, the Court contin-
ued to strike down state and local alienage classifications. 1 4
D. The Political Function Doctrine and the Rational
Relationship Test
Foley v. Connelie"49 marked the first time the Court invoked the
political function doctrine enunciated in Sugarman to uphold a state
states could constitutionally bar aliens from any private pursuit that is open to citizens."
Maltz, supra note 34, at 1165.
141 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1982); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
142 413 U.S. 634, 643, 646 (1973).
143 See id. at 641.
144 See id. at 642.
145 See id. at 647; see also 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12 (describing the
Sugarman holding as "narrow").
146 Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 647.
147 See id. at 648 (dicta).
148 The Court invalidated a Puerto Rican law that curtailed the ability of foreign na-
tionals to work as engineers, see Examining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores
de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976), and a New York rule that required citizenship or an intent
to naturalize to qualify for state financial aid for higher education, see Nyquist v. Mauclet,
432 U.S. 1 (1977).
149 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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alienage classification'- 50-a New York statute that prevented foreign
nationals from obtaining jobs as state troopers. 15-. The Court held
that police officers were important public figures and, based on that
finding, did not apply strict scrutiny to the alienage classificaton. 152
Writing for the Court, Chief Justice Burger stated that stri zt scrutiny
was appropriate where the state was distributing economic benefits on
the basis of alienage, but not where the state was defining its political
community. 1 53 In applying the less-stringent rational relationship test,
the Foley Court reasoned that the lower szandard of review was appro-
priate for laws relating to self-governance and the qualifications of of-
ficials whose duties involved important government functions. 5 4 The
New York law passed the rational relationship test because, among
other things, state poli'e officers were "clothed in the authority of the
state" and had broad discretion to enforce state laws.
155
The Couri expanded the scope of the political function excep-
tion the following year in Ambach v. Norwick.156 The Court upheld a
New York statute that prevented foreign nationals from obtaining per-
manent teaching certification if they were eligible for citizenship and
did not naturalize or if they were not yet eligible to become citizens
and would not promise to naturalize as soon as they could.15 7 The law
essentially prevented foreign nationals who failed to meet those re-
quirements from working in public schools.1 55 Although the Ambach
Court maintained that alienage classifications were still "inherently
suspect" and that it was no - reviving te special public interest doc-
trine, 159 the Court decided that t_e less-st.'ingent rational relationship
test was appropriate where a state alienage classification concerned a
function related to "the operation of the State as a governmental en-
tity." 160 Thus, the Court stated that it would use the rational relation-
ship standard if the state alienage classification furthered a
"governmental function." 16 1 The Court concluded that teachers fur-
thered an important governmental function by preparing young peo-
ple to become active citizens in democratic society-a role important
150 See id. at 299-300.
151 See id.
152 See id. at 297.
153 See id. at 295.
154 See id. at 297-98.
155 Id. at 298-99.
156 441 U.S. 68 (1979).
157 See id. at 70 & nn.1-2.
158 See id.
159 See id. at 73-75.
160 Id. at 78-79.
161 See id. at 78-81.
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to the country's political community' 62-and that the state law was
rationally related to that function.
In dissent, Justice Blackmun argued that alienage was not a rea-
sonable way to determine who was best-suited to serve as a teacher.
168
Justice Blackmun argued that secondary school teachers did not cre-
ate or execute public policy, 164 and that being a foreign national did
not make one less able to be a secondary school teacher. 165 Noting
that the statutory scheme would prefer a less-qualified teacher who
was a U.S. citizen over a better-qualified foreign national, the dissent
argued that the majority's reasoning was "constitutionally absurd" be-
cause the New York law would not allow, for example, a French citizen
to teach French. 166 The dissent also argued that it was "logically im-
possible" to distinguish the New York statute at issue from other stat-
utes the Court struck down in cases such as Sugarman.16 7 Indeed, it
seems difficult to comprehend why banning foreign nationals from
public teaching posts is acceptable, but banning noncitizens from
joining the state bar is improper.
The Court continued its expansive reading of the political func-
tion doctrine in Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, upholding a California law that
excluded foreign nationals from jobs as "peace officers."' 5 1 The case
concerned individuals who sought jobs as Spanish-speaking deputy
state probation officers.' 69 The five-Justice majority was untroubled by
the law's expansive definition of "peace officers," which covered sev-
enty kinds ofjobs including toll service employees, cemetery sextons,
and furniture and bedding inspectors. 170 The alienage classification,
the Court concluded, was a legitimate part of "the community's pro-
cess of political self-definition" 171 because deputy probation officers
"personify the State's sovereign powers."'172
The four dissenting Justices argued that California was motivated
by "state parochialism and hostility toward foreigners"-precisely the
162 See id.
163 See id. at 81 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
164 See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun began his dissent by
agreeing with the majority that the "touchstone" of the political function doctrine was that
states could demand citizenship forjobs that formulate "broad public policy." Id. at 82-83
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). He then devoted the remainder of his dissent to criticizing the
majority's reasoning and ultimate conclusion that teachers fulfill such a role. See Ad. at
82-90 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 87-88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
166 See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
167 See id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
168 454 U.S. 432, 436 (1982).
169 See id. at 435.
170 See id. at 442-43.
171 Id. at 439.
172 Id. at 447.
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type of state action the Court promised to guard against in Graham. '73
Interestingly, the dissent noted that while this law prohibited foreign
nationals from serving as peace officers, California law permitted for-
eign nationals to become state judges. 174
After Cabell, some commentators believed that the Court would
soon overrule Graham and its progeny. 75  That belief, however,
proved incorrect. In 1984, over only one dissent, 76 the Court struck
down a Texas statute that required citizenship for notaries public.177
Texas argued that notaries public played an important political func-
tion because they "authenticate written instruments, administer oaths,
and take out-of-court depositions." 78 Texas also contended that the
citizenship requirement furthered the state interest of ensuring that
notaries know state law.179 Neither argument impressed the Court. If
Texas truly wanted to ensure that notaries public were familiar with
state law, the Court stated, then testing all potential applicants was a
better way to fulfill that goal than a citizenship classification. s8 0 Like-
wise, the Court mentioned that states could not require citizenship for
admission to the bar'8 ' and that notaries public played less-important
roles in the legal system than attorneys and court officials.' 8 2 Conse-
quently, the Court concluded that notaries public did not fall within
the political function exception because that exception is reserved for
"positions intimately related to the process of democratic self-govern-
ment."18 3 After determining that the Texas law did not fall within the
exception, the Court applied strict scrutiny and struck the law
down. 184
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, the current boundaries of
the political function doctrine are difficult to map. The Court would
likely give states wide latitude to exclude foreign nationals from public
employment, as well as from taking part in key governmental func-
173 See id at 463 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
174 See id. at 459-60 & n.10 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
175 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1187.
176 See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 228 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). In a one-
sentence dissent, Justice Rehnquist stated that he dissented for the reasons articulated in
his dissent in Sugarman v. Dougal4 413 U.S. 634, 649 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
There, Justice Rehnquist argued, among other things, that the Fourteenth Amendment
prohibited racial discrimination, but did not prohibit discrimination based on citizenship.
See Sugarman, 413 U.S. at 649 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
177 See Fainter, 467 U.S. at 226-27.
178 Id. at 218 (describing the tasks fulfilled by notaries public).
179 See id. at 227-28.
180 See id.
181 See id. at 226 (citing In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 634 (1973)).
182 See id. at 226-27.
183 Id. at 220.
184 See id. at 228.
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tions, but not from a broad category of private occupations. 8 5 A state
probably could not create an expansive ban to prohibit foreign na-
tionals from working in all kinds of public posts, but could likely ex-
clude aliens from many specific governmental jobs, particularly ones
involving some degree of discretionary authority.
186
III
THE POLITICAL FUNCTION DOCTRINE IN PRACTICE
A. Traditional Legal Analysis
Although the purpose of this Note is to examine the efficiency of
the political function doctrine, a brief look at how commentators tra-
ditionally analyze the doctrine is helpful. The basic framework of the
current doctrine is clear, even if predicting the outcome of any partic-
ular case analyzed under the doctrine is difficult at best. Courts sub-
ject state alienage classifications to strict scrutiny, and the political
function doctrine is an exception to strict scrutiny.18 7 Commentators
thus criticize the political function doctrine as an "exception [that]
has swallowed the rule" 188 because the scope of the exception is easy
to widen simply by invoking "sweet-sounding rhetoric about the politi-
cal community, [that enables] courts [to] transform every state em-
ployee into a policymaker."'18 9 Moreover, the Court broadly construed
the term "special public interest" and validated a wide-ranging spec-
trum of anti-immigrant legislation, thereby removing most meaning-
ful protection for foreign nationals under the Yick Wo and Traux
precedents.1 90
The political function exception supposedly applies only to im-
portant jobs that involve formulating, reviewing, or executing broad
public policy. But determining whether a statute falls within this gen-
eral classification is often difficult. Indeed, many cases invoking the
doctrine to uphold state alienage classifications were five-four deci-
sions with vigorous dissents.' 91 The dissenting Justices often con-
tended that the majority misconstrued the key terms, such as
"important" and "formulating, reviewing, or executing broad public
185 See 3 ROTUNDA & NOWAK, supra note 30, § 18.12.
186 See id.
187 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1178-79 (discussing what Maltz calls the "Sugarman ex-
ception to the general rule of strict scrutiny," coined after the case that first mentioned
what eventually became the political function doctrine); John E. Richards, Public Employ-
nent Rights of Aliens, 34 BAYLOR L. REv. 371, 372-82 (1982).
188 See Richards, supra note 187, at 380.
189 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 412.
190 See id.
191 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979); Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 (1978).
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policy."1 92 In many instances, the dissenting Justices probably had the
stronger argument, as the majority seemed to expand the meaning of
the phrase "formulating public policy" to "carrying out public pol-
icy."19 Such a broad interpretation, Justice Marshall suggested,
would enable states to prohibit foreign nationals from working as
firefighters because firefighters technically carry out the public policy
of putting out fires. 194 The dissenting Justices in Ambach and Cabell
also argued that the majority was irrational in expanding the concept
of policy maker to include teachers and voluntary fire wardens.195
Two competing values are at play in political function doctrine
jurisprudence. The Court attempts to balance the symbolic value of
citizenship against the fundamental value of equal treatment under
the law. The conservative members of the Court generally extol the
virtues of citizenship and praise "a person's relationship to this coun-
try as a citizen." 196 Conservative Justices also focus on the mutability
of citizenship and emphasize that legal permanent residents (LPRs)
can choose to naturalize. 19 7 Consequently, these Justices believe that
prohibiting states from using alienage classifications would erode the
value of citizenship.' 98
On the other hand, the more liberal Justices favor a construction
of the word "important" that would apply only to a person holding "a
high-level job in public administration that affects large groups of the
body politic."1 99 This seems more logical and more consistent with
the notion of preserving important government functions for citizens.
As one commentator argued, the result of whether a particular type of
employment falls within the political function exception is often de-
cided by which side is able to convince five Justices rather than in
192 See, e.g., Foley, 435 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
193 See id at 305 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Knapp, supra note 1, at 412-13 (dis-
cussing the issue of determining whether a low-level official actually formulates govern-
ment policy).
194 See Foley, 435 U.S. at 303-04 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Knapp, supra note 1, at
412-13 (discussing how the political function doctrine, if applied expansively, would con-
sider firefighters and public street cleaners to be policy makers).
195 See Cabell, 454 U.S at 451-55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting); Ambach, 441 U.S. at 84
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
196 See Richards, supra note 187, at 378-79.
197 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 423, 425-27. Knapp provides an excellent critique of
conservative arguments in support of alienage classifications. She notes that citizenship is
a poor proxy for loyalty and that conservative opinions reflect an utter lack of knowledge
about what gaining citizenship entails.
198 See, e.g., Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634, 651 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting)
(arguing that the Fourteenth Amendment should not be invoked to strike down a state
alienage classification because "the Constitution itself recognizes a basic difference be-
tween citizens and aliens").
199 See Richards, supra note 187, at 380.
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accordance with any coherent logical framework.2 00 Moreover, the
Court's more liberal Justices contend that discrimination based on cit-
izenship runs counter to the fundamental value of equal treatment
under the law20 1 and the belief that one should judge individuals
based on qualifications.20 2 Alienage classifications that govern em-
ployment ensure that the best citizen gets the job, not the best
candidate. 203
B. The Political Function Doctrine and the Employment Market
An efficient legal doctrine provides the most positive results with
the fewest negative side effects. 20 4 This section evaluates whether the
political function doctrine is efficient. First, this section assesses
whether the political function doctrine coincides with the proper role
of regulation in markets. Second, this section outlines the effect of
the political function doctrine on the market.
Federal and state governments regulate markets for many goods
and services, such as radio communications, utilities, and employ-
ment. Markets are generally more efficient with less regulation; gov-
ernment intervention is warranted only where a market cannot
operate efficiently on its own because of a market failure caused by
monopoly, high information costs, or other externalities. 2 0 5
States did not enact citizenship requirements to correct a market
failure and help the market operate more efficiently. Citizenship is
not connected to competence or job performance and is therefore
200 See Maltz, supra note 34, at 1180-81 (counting the votes in modern alienage juris-
prudence decisions and noting that the justices who held the "swing votes" failed to "artic-
ulate[ I a clear, generally-applicable theory for distinguishing permissible from
nonpermissible distinctions between citizens and aliens").
201 See, e.g., Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291, 307 (1978) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (argu-
ing that the "exclusion of aliens" from state trooper jobs "violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment").
202 See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 85-86 (1979) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(contending that it is illogical to judge applicants for teaching posts based on their citizen-
ship status as opposed to their individual qualifications).
203 See id. at 84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (noting that an alienage classification would
prevent a well-qualified noncitizen Englishwoman from teaching "the grammar of the En-
glish language").
204 See A. MITCHELL POLINSKY, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND ECONOMICS 7 n.4 (1983);
THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 9 (Paul Burrows & Cento G. Veljanovski eds., 1981)
(stating that "social efficiency is a technical concept of unimprovability" in which everyone
benefits).
205 See FOUNDATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC APPROACH TO LAW 11-14 (Avery Wiener Katz
ed., 1998); Richard A. Posner, Essay, The Efficiency and the Efficacy of Title VII, 136 U. PA. L.
Rav. 513, 515 (1987) (stating that the government should not intervene in a market "not
marked by externalities, monopoly... [or] high costs of information, or any other condi-
tion that might justify such intervention on economic grounds").
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not a rational job requirement.20 6 State alienage classifications re-
quire employers to discriminate on the basis of citizenship when se-
lecting candidates for so-called political jobs, thus reducing the
number of eligible candidates for the targeted jobs.2 07 In such cir-
cumstances, employers must choose the best citizen for the job, as op-
posed to the best candidate.20  In an unrestrained market economy,
the merit principle-the principle that the best worker at any given
wage rate is hired-is self-enforcing. As one commentator noted,
"[e] mployers have an obvious financial self-interest in making employ-
ment decisions on the basis of merit. And competition, if not greed,
requires or leads them to pursue that self-interest with vigor."20 9 Be-
cause alienage classifications prevent employers from hiring employ-
ees based only on merit, these classifications harm employers by
disqualifying job candidates based on a characteristic wholly irrelevant
to work performance.
Some state alienage classifications prohibit foreign nationals
from owning particular kinds of businesses or engaging in certain oc-
cupations. 2 10 These citizenship requirements limit entry in those
targeted business fields and thereby stifle competition, based on a cri-
terion that is not connected to competence in the given field. Ideally,
consumers would select businesses based on price and competence,
but citizenship requirements add an additional, irrational factor that
impacts market performance.
The primary proponents of state citizenship requirements are
practitioners in specific fields and other interest groups who seek to
stifle-not encourage-competition.2 1' Thus, citizenship require-
ments are a form of protectionism,2 1 2 the effect of which is to increase
206 In fact, a citizenship requirement is in many ways the opposite of a ban on racial-
ethnic discrimination. A discrimination prohibition forbids an employer from considering
particular characteristics, such as race and ethnicity, when making hiring decisions; a citi-
zenship requirement forces an employer to consider citizenship when hiring employees.
207 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 18-19 (listing current state citizenship require-
ments for jobs such as boiler engineers, private detectives and firefighters). See generally
JohnJ. Donohue III, Essay, Is Title VIIEfficient , 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1411 (1986) (discussing
the effect of racism on the labor market and on minority workers seeking jobs); David A.
Strauss, The Law and Economics of Racial Discrimination in Employment: The Case for Numerical
Standards, 79 GEo. L.J. 1619 (1991) (same).
208 See Owen M. Fiss, A Theory of Fair Employment Laws, 38 U. CH. L. REv. 235, 241
(1971). Fiss states that "[t]his will tend to maximize the businessman's own wealth, and it
will foster society's interest in efficiency-producing the greatest number of goods and
services at the lowest cost." Id.
209 Id. at 249-50.
210 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 18-19. Specifically, some current state citizen-
ship requirements prohibit noncitizens from obtaining liquor licenses, becoming bail
bondsmen, or forming certain types of organizations.
211 See id. at 8.
212 See id.
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the prices for products and services in the protected industry.2 13 In
this regard, the political function doctrine seems to run counter to
the normal goal of regulation: it allows states to pass laws that make
the market less efficient.
The overlap between alienage and national origin is significant, a
fact that historically enabled states to use alienage classifications to
target specific racial and ethnic groups. 2 14 Laws are expressive and do
more than identify prohibited or permissible conduct-laws send
messages to the populace.2 15 By prohibiting foreign nationals from
serving as deputy probation officers or teachers, the state signals to its
residents that foreign nationals are considered to be less suitable, less
trustworthy, and less competent.21 6 Thus, some commentators believe
that such laws tacitly encourage discrimination and negative feelings
toward foreign nationals. 217 Moreover, discriminatory alienage classi-
fications perpetuate stereotypes about foreign nationals218 and im-
pose the substantial psychological costs associated with labeling a
group of people inferior.219
Citizenship requirements create a de facto loophole through
which states can not only allow but even require employers to engage
in racial discrimination. Alienage classifications-often motivated by
racial prejudice-deserve careful scrutiny because this country's his-
tory is replete with examples of racial hostility directed at foreign-
218 See, e.g., Donohue, supra note 207, at 1412-19 (describing the neoclassical eco-
nonic model of the labor market and the effect of discrimination on that market). Dono-
hue analyzes racial, as opposed to alienage, discrimination, but the effects on the market
would be analogous to a protectionist ban against employing a particular class of people.
214 See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (invalidating a
state law that prohibited noncitizens from obtaining a fishing license with the intention of
targeting Japanese individuals).
215 See Deborah Heilman, The Expressive Dimension of Equal Protection, 85 MINN. L. REv.
1, 1-3 (2000) (arguing that in Brown v. Board of Education the Court understood that the
"expressive nature" of segregation perpetuated the image of African Americans as being of
"lower worth" and that the constitutional harm resulted from the law's expressive
cha-acter).
216 See Romero, supra note 25, at 883-85. Romero discusses, inter alia, the constitu-
tional requirement that the U.S. president be a "natural born citizen" and the effect this
has on views of what kinds of people are, therefore, the most loyal. Romero argued that
the "Presidential Eligibility Clause" is a proxy for loyalty because it "suggests that natural
born citizens were more presumptively loyal than naturalized ones." Id. at 884. Romero
also contends that racial and ethnic profiling sends messages to the populace about who is
most likely to be disloyal to the country. Id. at 878 (noting studies that found that "the
legal measures taken by the federal government reinforce deeply-held negative stereo-
types-foreignness and possibly disloyalty-about Arabs and Muslims" (citations
omitted)).
217 See id.
218 See id.
219 See id. at 878.
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ers.22 0 Allowing states and local governments to discriminate based
on citizenship encourages the use of covert racial classifications 2 2 1-
classifications motivated by racial animus that courts should not toler-
ate. The United States has, regrettably, embarrassed itself on several
occasions in history because of its treatment of foreign nationals and
use of racist alienage classifications.2 2 2 Courts should not support a
legal doctrine that allows states to pass laws that will later stain the
country's history.
By enacting citizenship requirements for jobs, states can covertly
engage in inefficient racial discrimination. 22 3 Race, like citizenship, is
not relevant to a person's job performance and is therefore an irra-
tional factor to consider in employment decisions.22 4 Racial discrimi-
nation is also inefficient because it causes the disfavored class to invest
less in human capital.22 5 Members of a targeted group are less likely
to invest in education and training if the employment market will not
reward that investment with greater opportunities. 22 6 The use of race
as a criterion for hiring eliminates-for a large class of people-the
incentive for self-improvement because race is beyond a person's con-
trol. 2 2 7 In such circumstances, it would be rational for minorities to
220 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 413. Statistical evidence strongly suggests a correlation
between race and alienage. See id. at 401-02.
221 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 338-39.
222 See, e.g., Nyquist v. Mauclet, 432 U.S. 1 (1977); Examining Bd, of Eng'rs, Architects
& Surveyors v. Flores de Otero, 426 U.S. 572 (1976); In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973);
Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); see
also MIGRATION POLICY INSTIT., AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES,
AND NATIONAL UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, at 1 (2003) (detailing national origin profiling
on the part of the federal government in its search for alleged terrorists and the plight of
Arab and Muslim foreign nationals embroiled in the crackdown).
223 See Fiss, supra note 208, at 237 (stating that use of race as a factor in hiring "would
in any event impair rather than advance productivity and wealth maximization for the
individual businessman and for society as a whole"). There is a debate among scholars
regarding the efficiency of racial discrimination and prohibitions against racial discrimina-
tion, but the complexities of that debate are beyond the scope of this Note. See, e.g., GARY
BECKER, THE ECONOMICS OF DISCRIMINATION I (2d ed. 1971); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECo-
NOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 27.1 (3d ed. 1986); Donohue, supra note 207, at 1411; Posner,
supra note 205, at 517; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1643; Cass R. Sunstein, The Anticaste
Principle, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2410, 2422 (1994).
224 See e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 87 (1979) (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (stat-
ing that a citizenship requirement for public school teachers was "irrational"); Strauss,
supra note 207, at 1642.
225 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2418-19. Sunstein provides a thorough analy-
sis of the efficiency of racial discrimination and legal bans on discrimination. See also
Strauss, supra note 207, at 1619 (engaging in economic analysis of racial discrimination
and covering some of the same concepts as Sunstein).
226 See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2419 (describing the "vicious cycle or even a spiral"
that could be caused by racial discrimination as minority group members failed to reach
their full potential by not investing in training and education).
227 See Fiss, supra note 208, at 241; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1643; Sunstein, supra note
223, at 2416. For a discussion of the "motivational" effect of discrimination on minorities,
see Fiss, supra note 208, at 239.
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invest less in education.2 28 Underinvestment in training and educa-
tion by a class of workers prevents those workers from reaching their
maximum potential and prevents society from benefiting from those
workers' skills.2 29 Thus, the political function doctrine is inefficient
because it protects state alienage classifications from judicial scrutiny.
The political function doctrine affects a significant number of po-
tential employees. About one million foreign nationals gain perma-
nent resident status every year, 230 and they are typically eligible (but
not required) to naturalize after five years. 231 Thus, there are about
five million LPRs in the United States who cannot yet naturalize at any
given time. An LPR would not rationally invest in training for a pro-
fession from which he or she is barred. The five-year delay could
cause LPRs to forego certain investments in education and training
altogether, or, in the best circumstances, only create an inefficient
transition period in which an LPR cannot maximize his or her
productivity.232
In addition to affecting a significant number of potential employ-
ees, the political function doctrine, as currently interpreted by the
Court, applies to a wide range ofjobs as diverse as public school teach-
ers and peace officers. 233 New York has citizenship requirements for
establishing churches and serving as a public library director.23 4 In
Illinois, only citizens can serve as labor dispute mediators.2 35 In Texas
and Illinois, noncitizens cannot receive liquor licenses.2 36 Texas re-
quires citizenship of bail bondsmen and public safety department em-
ployees. 237 New Jersey requires citizenship of firefighters, boiler
engineers, tax collectors, pharmacists, physicians, optometrists, and
228 See Sunstein, supra note 223, at 2417.
229 See id. at 2419; Strauss, supra note 207, at 1626-27 (stating that discrimination
would cause "inefficient levels of investment in human capital" and mean that "society will
not benefit fully from [the minority group's] talents"); see also Donohue, supra note 207, at
1412 (stating that "legislation that prohibits employer discrimination may actually en-
hance ... economic efficiency"). Donohue believes laws that prohibit discrimination will
run "discriminators... from the market more rapidly" and therefore increase overall mar-
ket efficiency sooner. Id. at 1426.
230 RUTH ELLEN WASSEM, DOMESTIC SOCIAL POLICY DIVISION, U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY
ON PERMANENT ADMISSIONS, Order Code RL32235, at 2 (Feb. 18, 2004), at http://
fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/31352.pdf (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
231 See FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 88, § 5:14.
232 Some state citizenship requirements include exceptions for LPRs who promise to
naturalize at the earliest opportunity, but many laws do not include such exceptions. See
Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 19.
233 See, e.g., Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432 (1982); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S.
68 (1979). Almost every town has teachers and police officers. Citizenship requirements
for these jobs are thus likely to have a significant effect on the market.
234 See Plascencia et al., supra note 5, at 19.
235 See id.
236 See id.
237 See id.
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private detectives. 238 Thus, the political function doctrine signifi-
cantly affects market function because it permits state alienage classifi-
cations for many occupations.
Fortunately, state citizenship requirements are much less com-
mon than in prior decades,2 39 and states no longer enforce all citizen-
ship requirements. 2 40 Despite this, the citizenship requirements that
states do not enforce are often still listed on agency web pages.241 As
mentioned earlier, the expressive significance of laws is great-even if
the law is not enforced and does not limit access to a particular occu-
pation. Likewise, the lack of routine uniform enforcement could lead
to selective enforcement against particular ethnic groups.242 Moreo-
ver, disseminating information about state alienage restrictions in
public documents or on agency websites could discourage noncitizens
from applying for jobs because they might not know that the citizen-
ship requirements are not actually enforced in practice.
W
SUGGESTED REFINEMENTS TO THE CURRENT DOCTRINE
Although a major shift in the Court's alienage jurisprudence is
unlikely and some form of the political function doctrine will proba-
bly continue to exist, some refinements could better limit the scope of
the doctrine and thereby reduce the inefficiencies introduced into
the market. These proposed refinements would protect against racial
discrimination and ensure that state laws covered by the political func-
tion doctrine truly go to the heart of democratic self-governance.
This Note employs the traditional language and tests of the Court's
equal protection jurisprudence, as opposed to economic terms, to
demonstrate that this more efficient proposal is consistent with stan-
dard equal protection concepts. In short, the proposal's justification
emanates from the economic analysis of the political function doc-
trine, but the new framework this Note advocates remains consistent
with standard equal protection jurisprudence.
Courts should adopt a new approach when analyzing state laws
that purportedly fall within the political function doctrine. Specifi-
cally, courts should add another step to the analysis to prevent covert
racial classifications, read the political function doctrine more nar-
rowly, and increase the level of scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny for
238 See id.
239 See id. at 9 (finding that states impose far fewer citizenship requirements than they
did twenty years ago).
240 See id. at 16. The authors report that state officials informed them that citizenship
requirements "were about twice as likely to be ignored as enforced." Id.
241 Id. at 17.
242 See, e.g., Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 374 (1886).
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classifications that fall within the political function exception to tradi-
tional strict scrutiny analysis.
A. Recognize Racial Animus and Covert Classifications
First, courts should carefully scrutinize state laws to ensure that
alienage classifications are not actually state attempts to classify co-
vertly based on race. Supreme Court alienage jurisprudence has, re-
grettably, failed to adequately consider the potential misuse of
alienage classifications to target particular racial groups.2 43 Racial
prejudice was associated with discrimination against immigrants many
times during our country's history,244 and laws that classify based on
race are properly subject to strict scrutiny. Courts should first look for
evidence of racial animus when examining a local alienage classifica-
tion and then explicitly indicate whether such animus exists. Requir-
ing courts to explicitly indicate their findings regarding racial animus
will ensure that courts do not perform this in a cursory manner and
provide a record for appeal if the lower court is erroneous. Consider-
ing the overlap between race and alienage more seriously would help
eliminate covert racial classifications.
The Supreme Court already employs methods for detecting the
presence of racial animus.2 45 In applying the first step of this pro-
posed refinement to the political function doctrine, courts could use
the principles the Supreme Court established in equal protection ju-
risprudence regarding racial classifications to determine if a state
alienage classification is actually a covert racial classification. In deter-
mining whether a government actor violated the Equal Protection
Clause, courts search for signs of discriminatory intent and evidence
of disparate impact on the racial group.2 46 To support a finding of
243 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 323 (stating that "[a]s racial classifications fall into disfa-
vor with the judiciary, those with improper motives may instead turn to alienage classifica-
tions"); see alsoJohnson, supra note 2, at 1499-1509 (discussing the racial demographics of
immigrants and the failure of courts to adequately consider racism when scrutinizing alien-
age classifications). Boyd notes the extensive history of alienage discrimination in the
United States and contends that it was "motivated by racism, xenophobia, irrational stereo-
types, [or] a bare desire to harm a politically unpopular group." Boyd, supra note 4, at 323
(footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
244 See Knapp, supra note 1, at 413-15.
245 See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAv, supra note 30, § 18.4 (detailing "basic principles regard-
ing how a court determines the existence of a classification" such as searching for a govern-
ment actor's "discriminatory purpose" and noting the "disparate impact" of a law); Charles
Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 317, 325 (1987). Lawrence is more critical of the discriminatory intent requirement.
Although discriminatory intent is sometimes hard to prove, the principles announced in
the Court's decisions are helpful.
246 See Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (announcing that both disparate
impact and discriminatory intent are required components of a prima facie case of racial
discrimination). Evidence of disparate impact includes items such as statistics indicating
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discriminatory intent, the intent to discriminate need not be the sole
motivating factor behind the state's decision to use a classification as
long as the intent to discriminate was one factor.2 47 Proof of disparate
impact, along with other circumstantial evidence regarding the gov-
ernment's intent, satisfies the burden of establishing a prima facie
case of racial animus.2
48
Yick Wo indicates that the Court will also infer discriminatory in-
tent from discriminatory application of a rule. In Yick Wo, the city
ordinance at issue was facially neutral-it required a permit to oper-
ate a laundry in a wooden building-but the city only enforced the
rule against Chinese individuals. 249 There, the disparate impact was
so extreme that "no reason for it exist[ed] except hostility to the race
and nationality to which the petitioners belong[ed] ."25
In some situations, the Court may also presume discriminatory
intent if a government actor discriminated either in the past or in
another area.251 Thus, the Court might transfer evil intent from one
time period or one area to either the present day or another
location. 252
As the above discussion demonstrates, techniques and principles
for detecting racial animus are well-established and lower courts are
familiar with their application. Therefore, courts could apply the first
step of this proposed refinement to the political function doctrine-
searching for racial bias in the state's use of an alienage classifica-
tion-without the need to develop a new analytical framework.
B. Construe "Political Function" Narrowly
Courts should also construe the political function doctrine more
narrowly. Permitting states to read "political function" broadly en-
ables states to discriminate against racial groups and allocate eco-
nomic benefits based on citizenship. The more broadly courts
construe the doctrine, the more inefficiencies the doctrine is likely to
cause in the market. In particular, the Court should interpret the
terms "important" and "formulating policy" narrowly. 253 Additionally,
the imbalance in the racial groups affected by the scrutinized law. See 3 ROTUNDA & No-
wAK, supra note 30, § 18.4.
247 See Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Metro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265-66
(1977).
248 Washington, 426 U.S. at 242 (stating that "an invidious discriminatory purpose may
often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts").
249 See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 368 (1886).
250 Id. at 374.
251 See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 207 (1973). So far, the Court has only
used this presumption in school desegregation cases.
252 See id. at 210-11.
253 Indeed, the Court has emphasized the importance of limiting the political function
exception. See Bernal v. Fainter, 467 U.S. 216, 222 & n.7 (1984) (stating that "the political-
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courts should not use rhetoric to expand excessively the notion of
"policy makers" to include low-level government jobs and thereby
avoid subjecting alienage classifications to strict judicial scrutiny
under the guise of a purported "political function."
Narrowing the construction of "political function" is necessary be-
cause increasing the level of scrutiny for political functions from ra-
tional relationship to intermediate scrutiny alone might not
adequately police judicial misuse of the exception. If the term "politi-
cal function" becomes all-encompassing, courts would still subject
alienage classifications to a lower level of scrutiny (intermediate) than
is proper (strict). Because courts routinely use rules of statutory con-
struction to interpret exceptions narrowly, this proposal should not be
new to judges.2 54
C. Subject Political Functions to Intermediate Scrutiny
Finally, even if a state alienage classification truly relates to a po-
litical function, courts should apply intermediate scrutiny rather than
the rational basis test to the classification.2 5 5 Intermediate scrutiny is
necessary because the rational basis test fails to adequately police state
laws that classify based on alienage. While prohibiting all alienage clas-
sifications would arguably be more efficient, intermediate scrutiny is a
reasonable compromise and could limit the scope of the political
function doctrine and its corresponding negative impact on the mar-
ket without eliminating the doctrine altogether. Intermediate scru-
tiny would help prevent the exception from swallowing the rule by
invalidating state laws that are not adequately tailored to achieve im-
portant government objectives.
The Court currently subjects gender classifications to intermedi-
ate scrutiny,2 56 so this proposal also does not require the development
of a new analytical framework. In the gender context, the state must
establish an "exceedingly persuasive justification" for the classification
to pass intermediate scrutiny.257 Typically, that means the state must
seek to fulfill an important government objective and the means must
be substantially related to achieving that objective.2 58 Intermediate
scrutiny involves a more searching examination of whether the state
function exception must be narrowly construed; otherwise the exception will swallow the
rule and depreciate the significance that should attach to the designation of a group as a
'discrete and insular' minority for whom heightened judicial solicitude is appropriate").
254 See, e.g., KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 45 (7th ed. 1981) (discussing vari-
ous canons of statutory interpretation).
255 See Boyd, supra note 4, at 345-49.
256 See 3 ROTUNDA & NowAK, supra note 30, § 18.20 (describing the Court's framework
for analyzing gender classifications).
257 United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531-36 (1996).
258 See Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982).
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could achieve the same ends through nondiscriminatory means than
rational basis review.2 59
CONCLUSION
Regrettably, the United States does not always live up to the fun-
damental principles of equality embodied in the Constitution. If the
United States is a "welcoming country" as President Bush contends,
then it is a country that paradoxically welcomes foreign nationals and
then resents them for having arrived. State laws that severely con-
strain the employment opportunities of newcomers illustrate this
resentment.
Laws that discriminate against foreign nationals are economically
inefficient as well as morally improper and constitutionally questiona-
ble. Unfortunately, history shows that state and local governments di-
rect racial animosity toward foreign nationals without considering
market efficiencies. In addition to the moral and constitutional argu-
ments against racist treatment of foreign nationals, economic analysis
provides an independent justification for limiting the political func-
tion doctrine because it perpetuates market inefficiencies.
Consequently, states should not enact broad alienage classifica-
tions in the employment context, and federal courts should carefully
scrutinize such classifications and limit them to posts involving a
state's self-governance. Greater limitations on state use of alienage
classifications would protect politically powerless foreign nationals
from discrimination and allow labor markets to function efficiently.
This Note proposes doctrinal changes that are consistent with tradi-
tional equal protection jurisprudence and demonstrates that the polit-
ical function doctrine remains a Byzantine, constitutional oddity that
is not worth its cost.
"259 See id.
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